# 1NC

## K

Starting at 6:12

<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9EFnfairLes>

#### Silence on the human exploitative gaze towards non-humans ensures that anthropocentrism continues

Bell, York University department of education, and Russell, Lakehead University associate professor, 2k (Anne C. and Constance L., department of education, York University, Canada, and Canadian Journal of Environmental Education, “Beyond Human, Beyond Words: Anthropocentrism, Critical Pedagogy, and the Poststructuralist Turn,” CANADIAN JOURNAL OF EDUCATION 25, 3 (2000):188–203, http://www.csse-scee.ca/CJE/Articles/FullText/CJE25-3/CJE25-3-bell.pdf, p. 192)

We come to critical pedagogy with a background in environmental thought and education. Of primary concern and interest to us are relationships among humans and the “more-than-human world” (Abram, 1996), the ways in which those relationships are constituted and prescribed in mo- dern industrial society, and the implications and consequences of those constructs. As a number of scholars and nature advocates have argued, the many manifestations of the current environmental crisis (e.g., species extinction, toxic contamination, ozone depletion, topsoil depletion, climate change, acid rain, deforestation) reflect predominant Western concepts of nature, nature cast as mindless matter, a mere resource to be exploited for human gain (Berman, 1981; Evernden, 1985; Merchant, 1980). An ability to respond adequately to the situation therefore rests, at least in part, on a willingness to critique prevailing discourses about nature and to consider alternative representations (Cronon, 1996; Evernden, 1992; Hayles, 1995). To this end, poststructuralist analysis has been and will continue to be invaluable.¶ It would be an all-too-common mistake to construe the task at hand as one of interest only to environmentalists. We believe, rather, that dis- rupting the social scripts that structure and legitimize the human dom- ination of nonhuman nature is fundamental not only to dealing with environmental issues, but also to examining and challenging oppressive social arrangements. The exploitation of nature is not separate from the exploitation of human groups. Ecofeminists and activists for environ- mental justice have shown that forms of domination are often intimately connected and mutually reinforcing (Bullard, 1993; Gaard, 1997; Lahar, 1993; Sturgeon, 1997). Thus, if critical educators wish to resist various oppressions, part of their project must entail calling into question, among other things, the instrumental exploitive gaze through which we humans distance ourselves from the rest of nature (Carlson, 1995).¶ For this reason, the various movements against oppression need to be aware of and supportive of each other. In critical pedagogy, however, the exploration of questions of race, gender, class, and sexuality has proceeded so far with little acknowledgement of the systemic links between human oppressions and the domination of nature. The more-than-human world and human relationships to it have been ignored, as if the suffering and exploitation of other beings and the global ecological crisis were somehow irrelevant. Despite the call for attention to voices historically absent from traditional canons and narratives (Sadovnik, 1995, p. 316), nonhuman beings are shrouded in silence. This silence characterizes even the work of writers who call for a rethinking of all culturally positioned essentialisms.¶ Like other educators influenced by poststructuralism, we agree that there is a need to scrutinize the language we use, the meanings we deploy, and the epistemological frameworks of past eras (Luke & Luke, 1995, p. 378). To treat social categories as stable and unchanging is to reproduce the prevailing relations of power (Britzman et al., 1991, p. 89). What would it mean, then, for critical pedagogy to extend this investigation and critique to include taken-for-granted understandings of “human,” “animal,” and “nature”?¶ This question is difficult to raise precisely because these understandings are taken for granted. The anthropocentric bias in critical pedagogy man- ifests itself in silence and in the asides of texts. Since it is not a topic of discussion, it can be difficult to situate a critique of it. Following feminist analyses, we find that examples of anthropocentrism, like examples of gender symbolization, occur “in those places where speakers reveal the assumptions they think they do not need to defend, beliefs they expect to share with their audiences” (Harding, 1986, p. 112).¶ Take, for example, Freire’s (1990) statements about the differences between “Man” and animals. To set up his discussion of praxis and the importance of “naming” the world, he outlines what he assumes to be shared, commonsensical beliefs about humans and other animals. He defines the boundaries of human membership according to a sharp, hier- archical dichotomy that establishes human superiority. Humans alone, he reminds us, are aware and self-conscious beings who can act to fulfill the objectives they set for themselves. Humans alone are able to infuse the world with their creative presence, to overcome situations that limit them, and thus to demonstrate a “decisive attitude towards the world” (p. 90).¶ Freire (1990, pp. 87–91) represents other animals in terms of their lack of such traits. They are doomed to passively accept the given, their lives “totally determined” because their decisions belong not to themselves but to their species. Thus whereas humans inhabit a “world” which they create and transform and from which they can separate themselves, for animals there is only habitat, a mere physical space to which they are “organically bound.”¶ To accept Freire’s assumptions is to believe that humans are animals only in a nominal sense. We are different not in degree but in kind, and though we might recognize that other animals have distinct qualities, we as humans are somehow more unique. We have the edge over other crea- tures because we are able to rise above monotonous, species-determined biological existence. Change in the service of human freedom is seen to be our primary agenda. Humans are thus cast as active agents whose very essence is to transform the world – as if somehow acceptance, appreciation, wonder, and reverence were beyond the pale.¶ This discursive frame of reference is characteristic of critical pedagogy. The human/animal opposition upon which it rests is taken for granted, its cultural and historical specificity not acknowledged. And therein lies the problem. Like other social constructions, this one derives its persuasiveness from its “seeming facticity and from the deep investments individuals and communities have in setting themselves off from others” (Britzman et al., 1991, p. 91). This becomes the normal way of seeing the world, and like other discourses of normalcy, it limits possibilities of taking up and con- fronting inequities (see Britzman, 1995). The primacy of the human enter- prise is simply not questioned.¶ Precisely how an anthropocentric pedagogy might exacerbate the en- vironmental crisis has not received much consideration in the literature of critical pedagogy, especially in North America. Although there may be passing reference to planetary destruction, there is seldom mention of the relationship between education and the domination of nature, let alone any sustained exploration of the links between the domination of nature and other social injustices. Concerns about the nonhuman are relegated to environmental education. And since environmental education, in turn, remains peripheral to the core curriculum (A. Gough, 1997; Russell, Bell, & Fawcett, 2000), anthropocentrism passes unchallenged.1¶ p. 190-192

#### Their calls for widespread change fall into the same logic of progress that has resulted in speciesist violence and the destruction of the environment

Kochi, Queen's University School of Law lecturer, and Ordan, linguist, 08 (Tarik and Noam, Borderlands Volume 7 Number 3, 2008, "An Argument for the Global Suicide of Humanity,")

In another sense the ethical demand to respond to historical and present environmental destruction runs onto and in many ways intensifies the question of radical or revolutionary change which confronted the socialist tradition within the 19th and 20th centuries. As environmental concerns have increasingly since the 1970s come into greater prominence, the pressing issue for many within the 21st century is that of social-environmental revolution. [9] Social- environmental revolution involves the creation of new social, political and economic forms of human and environmental organisation which can overcome the deficiencies and latent oppression of global capitalism and safeguard both human and non-human dignity.¶ Putting aside the old, false assumptions of a teleological account of history, social-environmental revolution is dependent upon widespread political action which short-circuits and tears apart current legal, political and economic regimes. This action is itself dependent upon a widespread change in awareness, a revolutionary change in consciousness, across enough of the populace to spark radical social and political transformation. Thought of in this sense, however, such a response to environmental destruction is caught by many of the old problems which have troubled the tradition of revolutionary socialism. Namely, how might a significant number of human individuals come to obtain such a radically enlightened perspective or awareness of human social reality (i.e. a dialectical, utopian anti-humanist ‘revolutionary consciousnesse’) so that they might bring about with minimal violence the overthrow of the practices and institutions of late capitalism and colonial-speciesism? Further, how might an individual attain such a radical perspective when their life, behaviours and attitudes (or their subjectivity itself) are so moulded and shaped by the individual’s immersion within and active self-realisation through, the networks, systems and habits constitutive of global capitalism? (Hardt & Negri, 2001). While the demand for social-environmental revolution grows stronger, both theoretical and practical answers to these pressing questions remain unanswered.¶ Both liberal and social revolutionary models thus seem to run into the same problems that surround the notion of progress; each play out a modern discourse of sacrifice in which some forms of life and modes of living are set aside in favour of the promise of a future good. Caught between social hopes and political myths, the challenge of responding to environmental destruction confronts, starkly, the core of a discourse of modernity characterised by reflection, responsibility and action. Given the increasing pressures upon the human habitat, this modern discourse will either deliver or it will fail. There is little room for an existence in between: either the Enlightenment fulfils its potentiality or it shows its hand as the bearer of impossibility. If the possibilities of the Enlightenment are to be fulfilled then this can only happen if the old idea of the progress of the human species, exemplified by Hawking’s cosmic colonisation, is fundamentally rethought and replaced by a new form of self-comprehension. This self-comprehension would need to negate and limit the old modern humanism by a radical anti-humanism. The aim, however, would be to not just accept one side or the other, but to re-think the basis of moral action along the lines of a dialectical, utopian anti-humanism. Importantly, though, getting past inadequate conceptions of action, historical time and the futural promise of progress may be dependent upon radically re-comprehending the relationship between humanity and nature in such a way that the human is no longer viewed as the sole core of the subject, or the being of highest value. The human would thus need to no longer be thought of as a master that stands over the non-human. Rather, the human and the non-human need to be grasped together, with the former bearing dignity only so long as it understands itself as a part of the latter.

#### Obsession with discourse and narratives is anthropocentric.

Bell and Russell 2k (anne and constance, Canadian journal of education, http://www.csse-scee.ca/CJE/Articles/FullText/CJE25-3/CJE25-3-bell.pdf)JFS

Although we acknowledge the important contribution of poststructuralism to analyses of oppression, privilege, and power in education, we believe that educators must continue to probe its limitations and implications. Accordingly, we consider here how poststructuralism, as it is taken up within critical pedagogy, tends to reinforce rather than subvert deepseated humanist assumptions about humans and nature by taking for granted the “borders” (as in Giroux, 1991) that define nature as the devalued Other. We ask what meanings and voices have been pre-empted by the virtually exclusive focus on humans and human language in a humancentred epistemological framework. At the same time, we discuss how relationships between language, communication, and meaningful experience are being conceptualized outside the field of critical pedagogy (in some cases from a poststructuralist perspective) to call into question these very assumptions. Although we concentrate primarily on societal narratives that shape understandings of human and nature, we also touch on two related issues of language: the “forgetting” of nonverbal, somatic experience and the misplaced presumption of human superiority based on linguistic capabilities. In so doing, our intention is to deal constructively with some of the anthropocentric blind spots within critical pedagogy generally and within poststructuralist approaches to critical pedagogy in particular. We hope to illuminate places where these streams of thought and practice move in directions compatible with our own aspirations as educators.

#### (scratched from speech, but discourse arg came up in debate it’s so included) The post-human leads to the total triumph of anthropocentrism—this is impacted on the speciesism debate.

Sanbonmatsu 04

[John Sanbonmatsu, Asst Professor of Philosophy and Religion at the Worcester Polytechnic Institute, 2004, *The Postmodern Prince* p. 206-207]

The neologism *metahumanism* intentionally conveys a contradiction or tension. By emphasizing metahumanism, I am suggesting that we must go "beyond" the anthropocentrism of the traditional liberal, humanist project. And this we can only do by incorporating the nonhu­man other into our conception of "the human." This theme, which I develop through an outline of ethical practice grounded in attentive­ness to *othering,* is the main focus of this chapter. At the same time, by *metahumanism* I am also intentionally claiming a certain continuity with the Enlightenment, "progressive" tradition and ideal of a harmo­nious social order rooted in a positive account of our natural capacities and qualities as human beings.

Ontology has been in the news lately. Scientists have begun to arro­gate to themselves godlike powers, creating entirely novel kinds of

species in the lab, inserting rogue DNA (taken from other plants ~r a mals) directly into the ova of animals. New beings-in-the-world are being summoned into existence by the cunning of Reason, "thrown" into alien and aseptic machine world where they typically arrive chronicllya ill or disabled, disoriented, and utterly isolated from all other beings the universe. Still other scientists and entrepreneurs are reengineering our own species being at the physical, genetic level, charting the human genetic code in order to effect the ultimate reduction of the individual human being-or "its" parts--to the status of a designer commodity. Adorno once wrote: "In the midst of standardized, organized human units the individual persists .... But he is in reality no more than: mere function of his own uniqueness, an exhibition piece, like the fellow that once drew the wonderment and laughter of children's Now, we see, the *uniqueness* of the human *species* has been put on display as an exhibition piece (the genome) and is threatened with extinction.

Meanwhile, in the Western academy, cultural studies theorists and other academic intellectuals hold conferences celebrating our so-ca1led post-human times, singing the virtues of cyborgs, prosthetics, and bio-engineering. Post-humanism is merely the latest in a string of commodity concepts spun off by academic industrialists to shore up the crumbling appearance of use value in their work. Yet the significance of the discourse, I think, is far greater than this alone would suggest. *With* the arrival of post-humanism we may fast be approaching zero hour of the critical tradition. With the subject as such now placed *sous rature* (under erasure), but this time not merely by clever critics by scientists who literallymanipulate the stuff our dreams of ourselves are made of, even the poststructuralist project self-destructs, as destruction is rendered irrelevant by the *fragmentation* of the ontolog unity of *Dasein.* This may seem a trivial point, but critical theory is already dangerously in collusion with the final obliteration of things "human" by capital

#### The Alternative is to reject the affirmative’s anthropocentrism.

#### Discursive criticism is necessary to challenge the framework of Anthropocentrism- the domination of the non-human world is maintained through discourse and communal meanings.

**Turner 09**

Summer 09 (Rita Turner UMBC: An Honors University in Maryland “The Discursive Construction of Anthropocentrism”. Environmental Ethics; Summer2009, Vol. 31 Issue 2, p183-201, 19p. 2009 EBSCO <http://web.ebscohost.com/ehost/detail?vid=3&hid=106&sid=6c27a5b4-37cc-45d1-92e8-1efc915f4205%40sessionmgr110&bdata=JmxvZ2lucGFnZT1sb2dpbi5hc3Amc2l0ZT1laG9zdC1saXZl#db=aph&AN=42988162#db=aph&AN=42988162>)

**Our businesses, policies, and lifestyles cause unexamined consequences for** other people and other **living beings, and exact sweeping destruction on the very ecosystems which support all life, including our own**. A major factor contributing to **this destructive behavior is the anthropocentric character** of the dominant Western world view, **which conceives of the nonhuman living world as apart from and less important than the human world, and which conceptualizes nonhuman nature -** including animals, plants, ecological systems, the land, and the atmosphere-**as inert, silent, passive, and valuable only for its worth as a resource for human consumption. This anthropocentric conceptual framework is constructed, transmitted, and reproduced in the realm of discourse**, in all of the modes and avenues through which we make and express cultural meaning. We need to make explicit the ways that mainstream Western and American discourse promotes anthropocentrism and masks, denies, or denigrates interdependence, and we need to find ways to reformulate and reframe our discouse if we are to produce the sort of ecological consciousness that will be essential for creating a sustainable future

## Case

#### Situated Knowledge rejects IDENTITY as ordering principles – it relies upon a completely constructivist view of the world obscuring MATERIAL OPPRESSION that exists beyond language – Her situated knowledge theory also offers no hope for emancipation away from the social science model

Campbell 4 (The Promise of Feminist Reflexivities: Developing Donna Haraway's Project for Feminist Science Studies¶ Kirsten Campbell Hypatia 19.1 (2004) 162-182)

In these terms, "situated knowledges" functions as a deconstructive concept because it permits FSS to identify the limits of existing accounts of scientific knowledge. How, then, does Haraway conceive of its reconstructive elements, which would permit FSS to construct new accounts of science?¶ Haraway argues that feminist models of reflexivity need to construct their accounts of science from "the vantage points of the subjugated; there is good reason to believe that vision is better from below the brilliant space platforms of the powerful (Hartsock, 1983a; Sandoval, n.d.; Harding, 1986; and Anzaldúa, 1987)" (1991, 190-91). Following these standpoint theorists, Haraway nominates the standpoints of the subjugated as the preferred positioning from which FSS should constitute its analysis of science. She suggests that "'[s]ubjugated' standpoints are preferred because they seem to promise more adequate, sustained, objective, transforming accounts of the world" (1991, 191). It is not simply that all perspectives are partial. Some perspectives are more truthful, some standpoints more adequate, and some positions offer feminism a better and more critical vision of science. [End Page 170]¶ In this account, Haraway's concept of standpoint refers to the social position of the knower. Baukje Prins points out that "Haraway's idea of partial positioning, however, must not be confused with identity politics" (1995, 357). Haraway rejects identity epistemologies, in the sense that she emphasises the construction of the subject rather than assumes that identity is a preexisting entity (1991, 193).[13](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/hypatia/v019/19.1campbell.html" \l "FOOT13) Indeed, there is no singular subject of "oppositional history," but instead multiplicities of subject positions (1991, 193). Haraway rightly insists on "the impossibility of innocent 'identity' politics and epistemologies as strategies for seeing from the standpoints of the subjugated" (1991, 192). However, if Haraway's model of situated knowledges rejects identity epistemologies for FSS, it does not reject standpoint epistemologies.[14](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/hypatia/v019/19.1campbell.html" \l "FOOT14)¶ Haraway's standpoint reflexivity assumes that a relation exists between critical knowledge and social position. Her model contends that in a differentiated social space, different social positions will produce different knowledges. Because different knowers have different knowledges, certain social positions produce "better," that is, more accurate, descriptions of the social world. So, for example, a knower occupying a social position of subjugation will provide a more accurate knowledge of oppressive social relations. For this reason, Haraway prefers "subjugated standpoints" as the ground of feminist reflexivity, because a feminist account of science that begins from their vantage point provides a "better" or more accurate account of the constitution of scientific knowledge. Similarly, Haraway describes feminist knowledge as "a critical vision consequent upon a critical positioning in inhomogenous gendered social space" (1991, 195). In this account, feminist reflexivity as an oppositional practice relies upon "critical positioning" (193). Haraway's model founds the critical knowledge of FSS upon the position of the knower, whether it is the social position of the subjugated or the political position of the feminist. Ultimately, subject position is the ground of critical knowledge because subjective embodiment situates the subject in social space, the social situatedness of the subject determines its subject position, and subject position founds critical knowledge.¶ Haraway's model of FSS, then, founds its reflexive practice upon the "critical positioning" of the feminist knower. However, three problematic and unresolved tensions weaken the foundations of this model. First, a tension exists between the standpoint of women and the standpoint of feminists, as it does not clearly distinguish between the political position of the feminist and the social position of women (see Haraway 1991, 190-91). Haraway does not address the difference between the critical position of the feminist knower and the subjugated position of women. Either the critical knowledge of the feminist is conditional upon her differential social position as a woman or it is contingent upon her politics (rather than her position within social relations). Because Haraway does not sufficiently distinguish feminism's critical knowledge from women's subjugated [End Page 171] knowledges, her model of FSS appears to links feminist critical reflexivity to the differential social standpoint of women.¶ The linking of reflexive science studies to the different standpoints of knowers leads to a second tension in Haraway's concept of reflexivity. Haraway argues against "Western epistemological imperatives to construct a revolutionary subject from the perspective of a hierarchy of oppressions" (1991, 176), and argues that FSS needs to understand the standpoint of the subjugated in the nonessentialist terms of the complex social practices that construct it. However, Bat-Ami Bar On points out that without an adequate theory of power or sociality, "standpoint" comes to function as an outcome of the singular and unitary structures that "fix" the position of the individual knower (1993, 96). While Haraway acknowledges the multiple axes of oppression, she does not adequately theorise them except to imply that oppression exists as an effect of concrete social structure. Indeed, she does not offer an account of the sociality that produces subject positions, other than in the most general terms of "White Capitalist Patriarchy" (1991, 197).[15](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/hypatia/v019/19.1campbell.html" \l "FOOT15) For this reason, the standpoint of the subjugated in this model of reflexivity comes to appear as if it is an essentialist account of the subject, in which critical knowledge reflects social identity.¶ The linking of knowledge and identity points to a third tension between constructivism and empiricism in this model of reflexive FSS. Haraway follows a constructivist epistemology in her insistence that "[t]o see from below is neither easily learned nor unproblematic" because "there is no immediate vision from the standpoints of the subjugated" (1991, 191, 193). In this model, practices construct all knowledge, including that of the subjugated. However, she also assumes that that the subjugated do possess particular knowledge in the sense that their experiences apprehend a truth of the world. Critical knowledge that derives from an experience of domination is "more truthful" in its description of that domination than that which does not. It therefore permits FSS to provide a more accurate and critical account of science. However, this formulation raises the problem of whether the possibility exists of a knowledge "outside" social practices. The feminist standpoint element of Haraway's model of FSS admits to such a possibility, but the constructivist element of Haraway's model does not. Practices either construct knowledge, in which case there is no possibility of critical knowledge (constructivism), or they do not, in which case there is a possibility of critical knowledge (feminism).¶ These tensions within Haraway's reconstructive project can be seen as symptomatic of the problem of "ontological gerrymandering" (Woolgar 1993, 98). This phrase describes an epistemological position that accepts the constructivist account of knowledge, and hence the relativistic nature of all knowledge, while at the same time positing its own knowledge claims as accurate descriptions of reality, and thereby excluding its own knowledge claims from being [End Page 172] "relativist." In this position, all other knowledge claims are relativistic while one's own knowledge claims are realist and participate in an "objectivist ontology" (Woolgar 1993, 98).¶ Although Haraway offers a strategy for evading this dilemma, she does no more than suggest or sketch it. This strategy contends that if practices construct knowledge, some practices construct their object of knowledge in ways that reproduce existing systems of inequalities while others construct it in less oppressive and more liberatory ways. In this way, particular kinds of practice distinguish FSS from SSS. Haraway (1991) suggests that two practices can help FSS construct its accounts of science in terms of feminist politics. The first practice, "self-reflection," is similar to the SSS formulation of an interrogation of the practices that construct knowledge. Haraway argues that "[w]e are not immediately present to ourselves. Self-knowledge requires a semiotic-material technology linking meanings and bodies" (1991, 192). However, she does not indicate what that "semiotic-material technology" might be. The second practice she describes as "connection"—the ability of the subject to connect to other subjects (human and non-human). She suggests that "[a] scientific knower seeks the subject position not of identity, but of objectivity; that is, of partial connection" (193). This objectivity represents "the possibility of webs of connection called solidarity in politics and shared conversations in epistemology" (191). However, Haraway does not explain how to do this. Rather, she poses it as a problem: "[u]nderstanding how these visual systems work, technically, socially, and psychically ought to be a way of embodying feminist objectivity. . . . But how to see from below is a problem requiring at least as much skill with bodies and language [and] with the mediations of vision" (1991, 190-91). "Situated Knowledges," (Haraway 1991), then, offers a strategy for developing a feminist model of reflexive science studies but ultimately does not develop that model. Despite its promise, "Situated Knowledges" (1991) does not answer the science question in feminism.

#### Haraway cannot successfully break from modern science – her process of emancipation relies upon traditional assumptions of what it means to BE RATIONAL

Campbell 4 (Hypatia 19.1 (2004) 162-182The Promise of Feminist Reflexivities: Developing Donna Haraway's Project for Feminist Science Studies¶ Kirsten Campbell)

Allessandra Tanesini argues that Haraway's "Situated Knowledges" (1991) is a "transitional paper where Haraway has not freed herself from the representational model" of SSS reflexivity (1999, 180). Haraway moves from SSS reflexivity in her more recent work, "The Promises of Monsters" (1992) and Modest Witness@Second-Millennium.FemaleMan©-Meets-OncoMouse™ (1997). She develops those promising practices of reflexive knowledge and of connective politics of "Situated Knowledges" with her later formulation of a reconstructive model of FSS: "diffraction" (see Haraway 1992 and 1997). [End Page 173]¶ Diffractive Promises¶ [R]eflexivity is not enough to produce self-visibility. Strong objectivity and agential realism demand a practice of diffraction, not just reflection. Diffraction is the production of difference patterns in the world, not just of the same reflected—displaced—elsewhere.¶ —Haraway, Modest Witness¶ In "The Promises of Monsters" (1992) and Modest Witness (1997), Haraway offers a reworking of her earlier model of FSS. For Haraway (1997), "[r]eflexivity is a bad trope for escaping the false choice between realism and relativism in thinking about strong objectivity and situated knowledges in technoscientific knowledge" (16). In its place, Haraway offers a new model of "diffraction" that she hopes will produce "effects of connection, of embodiment, and of responsibility for an imagined elsewhere" (1992, 295). Her project is explicitly political and utopian. For Haraway, "the purpose of this excursion is to write theory. . . in order to find an absent, but perhaps possible, other present" (295). To write theory is to provide a contestatory reconfiguration of the present.¶ The concept of "diffraction" relies not on a model of representation but of "articulation." Unlike SSS, Haraway's model of knowledge does not understand it as a practice of representation, that is, in the sense of a subject representing an object. Rather, Haraway suggests that articulation is a practice in which we construct a relation to others—not as objects but as subjects or actants (1992, 313). These actants include human and non-human actors, ranging from the scientist in her laboratory to the genetically modified oncomouse that she creates.[16](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/hypatia/v019/19.1campbell.html" \l "FOOT16) Actants are not passive: "the world" is agentic and interacts with knowers. Therefore "knowing becomes a way of engaging with the world, and to understand it we must study the patterns created by interactions" (Tanesini 1999, 184).¶ If articulation is Haraway's new model of knowledge, then we can understand diffraction as her new model of the critical knowledge of FSS. She argues that her invented category of diffraction, "the production of difference patterns, might be a more useful metaphor for the needed work than reflexivity" (1997, 34). For Haraway, the critical knowledge of FSS should diffract, rather than reflect, existing patterns of technoscience. Tanesini argues that "[w]hat is of crucial important about diffraction is that it does not objectify. . . . Instead, it takes into account the effects, the interferences generated by the other" (1999, 184). Diffraction engages with the different possible patterns that interactions with others create. For Haraway, the "interference patterns" of diffraction can shift existing meanings. Diffraction is a "metaphor for the effort to make a difference in the world" (1997, 16). [End Page 174]¶ Drawing upon Latour's actor network theory (see Latour 1993), Haraway argues that "material-semiotic" practices produce networks of human and non-human actants (1992, 298). Following Latour, Haraway understands these networks as having an "artifactual social nature" because practices produce the "natural" and the "social," the "subject" and the "object," the "human" and the non-human" (1992, 313). Diffraction intervenes in existing networks of actants in order to construct new actants and new networks between them. That possibility, Haraway argues, is contingent upon producing a "differential/oppositional artifactualism" (1992, 298). For Haraway, diffraction articulates new actants—"inappropriate/d others"—that exist in different networks to those of domination. These new actants are "those who have been put in the position of objects, those who have been marginalized and usually denied the status of knowing and moral subjects" (Prins 1995, 356). However, diffraction also aims to build more powerful collectives of such actants, constructing networks of "critical, deconstructive relationality . . . as the means of making potent connection that exceeds domination" (Haraway 1992, 299). For this reason, Haraway argues that "reflexive artifactualism offers serious political and analytical hope" (295).¶ Haraway's later model of feminist critical reflexivity is the reflexive artifactualism of diffraction. Haraway suggests that "[w]hat we need is to make a difference in material-semiotic apparatuses, to diffract the rays of technoscience so that we get more promising interference patterns" (1997, 16). Diffraction is a material-semiotic technology that produces feminist accounts of science. This model of reflexive FSS suggests that it requires new "material-semiotic" practices from which to construct its accounts of science. These diffractive practices draw upon the earlier models of the reflexive knowledge and connective politics of Haraway's "Situated Knowledges" (1991).¶ In Modest Witness, Haraway describes diffraction as an oppositional practice in which we learn to think our political aims from "the analytic and imaginative standpoint" of those existing in different networks to those of domination (1997, 198). Haraway argues that "[a] standpoint is not an empiricist appeal to or by 'the oppressed' but a cognitive, psychological, and political tool for more adequate knowledge judged by the nonessentialist, historically contingent, situated standards of strong objectivity. Such a standpoint is the always fraught but necessary fruit of the practice of oppositional and differential consciousness. A feminist standpoint is a practical technology rooted in yearning, not an abstract philosophical foundation" (1997, 198-99). Therefore, FSS needs to engage with political as well as material-semiotic practice, for "feminist knowledge is rooted in imaginative connection and hard-won practical coalition" (1997, 199). Feminist standpoint involves connection and coalition, which involve "accountability to each other" and to political ideals such as "freedom and justice" (1997, 199). This model of reflexive feminist science studies proposes two foundational practices. First, the construction of the reflexive standpoint [End Page 175] of the feminist knower in the reflexive practice of oppositional and differential consciousness. Second, the constitution of feminist accounts of science in the practice of connective and coalitional feminist politics.¶ Reflexive Diffractions¶ However, Haraway does not adequately develop this model of reflexive feminist science studies. A consequence of this failure to elaborate the model of diffraction is that Haraway's current formulation of reflexive practice suffers a number of weaknesses. Central to the model of diffraction is the reflexive practice of the "oppositional and differential consciousness" of the feminist knower. Haraway describes this position of the feminist knower as being an "analytic and imaginative standpoint" (1997, 198). It is analytic because it is a position that critical analysis, reasoning, and theoretical knowledge produce. In this sense, it is an intellectual or "cognitive" practice. However, it is also an imaginative position, in which one imagines oneself in the place of the other. Therefore it is also an identificatory or "psychological" practice. Finally, that position is a political practice because the political commitments of the knower produce it.¶ Because Haraway's model collapses these three practices, it does not acknowledge the complexity of their interrelationship or the difficulty of providing an account of the production of this standpoint. For example, does a political commitment to feminism subtend an imaginative relation to other women? What practices construct these imaginative connections with others? How might FSS understand the subject that comes to occupy this standpoint, and how does she come to occupy it? It appears that Haraway does not address these questions because she conceives of a feminist standpoint as a particular position of the knowing subject rather than as an outcome of cognitive, psychological and political practices.¶ As Haraway does not elaborate how these practices construct reflexive FSS, her model of diffraction appears to found itself upon the standpoint of a subject, rather than developing an account of reflexive epistemic practices and how those practices produce a political standpoint. The reasoning of this argument is as follows: if the knower founds knowledge, then in order to produce new forms of knowledge it is necessary to produce a new knowing subject. Rather than asking what practices produce the subject, the subject becomes the foundation of new critical forms of knowledge.¶ For this reason, this model does not escape a classical rationalist model of the knower in which a conscious self founds knowledge. Haraway presents a quite conventional account of the knower as a rational and autonomous individual. This individual produces a knowledge that is not shot through with affect, emotion, and fantasy—that is, with irrationality. Its practices and its standpoint are the outcomes of rational decisions. Those complex and irrational practices[End Page 176] that attach us to our identities do not appear in this account. Accordingly, this model does not acknowledge that these phantasmic relations might also construct feminist knowledge. It is possible to see Haraway's conceptual separation of analytic and imaginative standpoints, and its concomitant emphasis upon an oppositional consciousness, as being symptomatic of this rationalist conception of the subject.¶ Similar gaps appear in Haraway's account of reflexivity as a collective practice. For example, Haraway's model contends that feminist collectivities consist of networks of affiliated actants tied together by political, not social, interests. However, FSS requires a stronger account of how those affiliations produce knowers and of the production of the coalitional and connective affiliations themselves. How does a relation to others produce a feminist knower? Is it only the rational decision of political affiliation, or are other social affiliations also at work? Which practices are feminist and which are not? These questions about the practice of feminist science studies ask how we produce difference patterns in the world.

#### Haraway’s conception of the cyborg is a counterproductive trope for understanding oppression – it only reinforces harmful standpoint epistemologies instead of Situated Knowledge that the affirmative seeks –

Bartsch 1 (Configurations 9.1 (2001)127-164 [Access article in PDF]¶ Witnessing the Postmodern Jeremiad: (Mis)Understanding Donna Haraway's Method of Inquiry¶ Ingrid Bartsch University of South Florida¶ Carolyn DiPalma University of South Florida¶ Laura Sells Louisiana State University)

"The heuristic value of scientific analogies," rhetorician Kenneth Burke tells us, "is quite like the surprise of metaphor. The difference seems to be that the scientific analogy is more patiently pursued, being employed to inform an entire work or movement, where the poet uses his metaphor for a glimpse only." [51](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/configurations/v009/9.1bartsch.html" \l "FOOT51) For Haraway, the metaphor becomes more than a poet's glimpse: it is a patiently pursued heuristic that informs her oeuvre. Metaphor, as an inventional strategy, is key to the crucial distinction she makes between, for instance, the OncoMouse as a scientific technical object of knowledge that is actually a specular construct, and the OncoMouse as a material-semiotic actant with whom she can engage in a coalition relationship to produce knowledge.¶ The metaphors that Haraway pursues share several features--most notably, a hybrid nature that instantiates her ironic vision, and a [End Page 139] productive capacity to encourage new ways of thinking about the world. All of her metaphors are liminal creatures, gargoyles made of confused categories. As Burke reminds us in his discussion of the gargoyles of the Middle Ages, such hybrids are instances of "planned incongruities" in which putting a man's head on a bird's body "violates one order of classification in order to stress another one." [52](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/configurations/v009/9.1bartsch.html" \l "FOOT52) The classical taxonomies of Aristotle and Linnaeus, for instance, are foundational to how both science and language work by clustering various categories into typographies, relationships, cladograms, or tree structures. From the taxonomies of poetry to rhetoric to biology, tree after tree of families and relatives organizes and explains environments and, in fact, our very lives. Haraway's metaphors, which come from the realm of the gargoyle, intentionally confuse taxonomies. Guided perhaps by what Burke might call a "principle of innappropriateness," a "stylistic mercureality," or a "methodical misnaming," her hybrid creatures force linkages that rethink the imposed and acceptable tree structures of Western culture. [53](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/configurations/v009/9.1bartsch.html" \l "FOOT53)¶ Probably the best-known of her hybrid figures, the cyborg exemplifies Haraway's ironic feminist vision. The cyborg is the mule in her pantheon of metaphors; it performs the crucial and substantial labor of carrying her arguments through her entire work. It focuses on key elements in her prophetic visions: the necessity for connection and community across difference without transcendence, or without folding difference into a reductive similarity--a state of grace achievable through coalition. The cyborg performs the function of radical nominalism; it names the condition of women's lives within the logic of late capitalism in which the key boundaries between human and animal, human and machine, and physical and nonphysical have imploded. [54](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/configurations/v009/9.1bartsch.html" \l "FOOT54)¶ Like mules, however, the cyborg is a generic crossbreed that cannot reproduce. In other words, it is a sterile and nonproductive figure. Born in 1985, in the "Manifesto for Cyborgs," Haraway's cyborg is now an adolescent. Without abandoning it in its teenage years, we would like to point to the theoretical and political limits with which it is constrained: the cyborg is a literalized, hypermasculine, and relative figure.¶ First, even though Haraway herself clearly sees the importance of constantly shifting metaphors to prevent such a fate, the cyborg has become literalized. Indeed, it now serves as the icon or figurehead for a loose confederacy of cyborg scholars who align themselves and [End Page 140] their theoretical interests with the work of Donna Haraway. [55](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/configurations/v009/9.1bartsch.html" \l "FOOT55) This is evident in the number of academic publications and conference papers that jockey the cyborg's currency in academic discourse. Unfortunately, this very currency also undermines its rhetorical power and concomitant liberatory potential through an overuse that fixes and literalizes its meaning. In many ways, then, it is a dead metaphor.¶ Second, and related to the first, the cyborg's productive capacity has always been overly constrained by its hypermasculine, technoscientific antecedents. Even though Haraway claims that it is illegitimate and therefore should have no loyalties to its parents, [56](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/configurations/v009/9.1bartsch.html" \l "FOOT56) evidence of its loyalty abounds. The cyborg is too imbricated within the system of its origin, too heavily inflected by the militarized technoscientific doctrine of C3I (command-control-communication-intelligence), to escape. In other words, it is an overdetermined subject. [57](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/configurations/v009/9.1bartsch.html" \l "FOOT57) It is disciplined by its entanglement in a preexisting narrative web of power. This is evident, for instance, in the way that several "cyborg" scholars overemphasize the popular,Terminator/Terminator 2 image of the cyborg over the political metaphor that Haraway attempts to attribute to it. [58](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/configurations/v009/9.1bartsch.html" \l "FOOT58)¶ In her interview with Constance Penley and Andrew Ross, Haraway states that the cyborg is a "polychromatic grrl" who tries awfully hard not to be a woman. [59](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/configurations/v009/9.1bartsch.html" \l "FOOT59) In the "Manifesto for Cyborgs," she writes that the inspiration for and a primary model of the cyborg [End Page 141] was the construct "women of color," a rhetorical and political coalition in which women of multiple marginalized groups coalesce around a common and, significantly, self-determined term that retains both similarity and difference. [60](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/configurations/v009/9.1bartsch.html" \l "FOOT60) Most cyborg scholarship fails to address this crucial political element of the metaphor and stresses instead the cyborg's appearance in popular culture or in the theoretical writings of high postmodernism. [61](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/configurations/v009/9.1bartsch.html" \l "FOOT61) Scholarly treatments of some high-tech invention rendered in terms of the cyborg metaphor are commonplace, such as Andrea Slane's delightful treatment of women's relationship to computers in popular film. [62](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/configurations/v009/9.1bartsch.html" \l "FOOT62)Academic work that treats a political coalition in cyborg terms, however, barely exists. As a result, feminists such as Teresa Ebert can easily accuse Haraway of overemphasizing the realm of the figurative to the exclusion of women's material conditions. [63](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/configurations/v009/9.1bartsch.html" \l "FOOT63)¶ Third, despite its desire to be otherwise, the cyborg is a relative figure. The aggregate of its component units is maintained by comparative--that is, relative--circumstances. As a figure with multiple components, its strength lies in its potential ability to foreground multiple categories of identity and to deconstruct the universal white woman, or the universal human subject, by pointing to multiple identities and attempting to erode the boundaries between them. Its hybrid nature illustrates the impulse to unite disparate parts into coalitions. The cyborg adds together its component parts--it is nature AND machine AND human. While it might indeed seek to expose identity categories as no longer distinct, separate, or isolated, in actuality it remains only an aggregate figure, or simply an additive figure. Elizabeth Spelman refers to this additive characteristic as "tootsie roll" or "pop-bead metaphysics," where each part "is separable from every other part, and the significance of each part is unaffected by the other parts." [64](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/configurations/v009/9.1bartsch.html" \l "FOOT64) [End Page 142]¶ Although Haraway attempts to represent the cyborg as more than simply the sum of its parts, it is too easily reducible because it does not feature simultaneity--a point Haraway herself recognizes. [65](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/configurations/v009/9.1bartsch.html" \l "FOOT65) In other words, simultaneity foregrounds a mutually and actively informing process that is in motion along multiple axes of power. Simultaneity requires multiple sites, active tension, and the recognition of the possibility of inhabiting more than one location at a time. This recognition affords the cross-contamination, blending, and mutation of multiple sites. The cyborg, however, simply names a juncture, a site of articulation, and then takes up residence in that moment. Once named, it travels nowhere. It fails to address fully how identity categories mutually inform and are dependent upon each other. In other words, it does not address the dynamic tension between categories.¶ Not only is Haraway's cyborg overdetermined by its technoscientific antecedents, but it fails the ethical charge of relationality that distinguishes situated knowledges from standpoint theory. Rey Chow points out in "Postmodern Automatons" that the cyborg and its liberatory potential exist in a postmodern world, the postindustrial world of Silicon Valley, whose "foundations are not only emancipatory but also Eurocentric and patriarchal." [66](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/configurations/v009/9.1bartsch.html" \l "FOOT66) It is ultimately a figure relative to the First World conditions of technoscience and its attendant privileges and unwitting complicity with eliding the "cultural trauma and devastation" rendered on Third World cultures, first by the imperialism of Western modernity, and second by postmodernity's displacement of modernity. [67](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/configurations/v009/9.1bartsch.html" \l "FOOT67)¶ So, the cyborg suffers from its heavy technoscience inflection, which causes it to settle down too quickly in untenable ways. The sterility of a fixed position and the inability to reinvent itself and create new categories constrain its usefulness to theorizing and imagining liberatory possibilities. In short, it is too embedded within the system, it lacks the simultaneous aspect of relationality, and it is too comparativist a position to allow categories to move freely.

## Back on the K

#### Their attempt to bind the language of law with the language of war masks the species war at the foundation of the law of war. Their framing of what war is allows for all forms of suffering to continue

Kochi 9

“species war: law, violence, and animals”, 353-359

In everyday speech, in the words of the media, politicians, protestors, soldiers and dissidents, the language of war is linked to and intimately bound up with the language of law. That a war might be said to be legal or illegal, just or unjust, or that an act might be called “war” rather than terror or crime, displays aspects of reference, connection, and constitution in which the social meaning of the concepts we use to talk about and understand war and law are organised in particular ways. The manner in which specific terms (i.e. war, terror, murder, slaughter, and genocide) are defined and their meanings ordered has powerful and bloody consequences for those who feel the force and brunt of these words in the realm of human action. In this paper I argue that the juridical language of war contains a hidden foundation – *species war*. That is, at the foundation of the *Law of war* resides a species war carried out by humans against non-human animals. At first glance such a claim may sound like it has little to do with law and war. In contemporary public debates the “laws of war” are typically understood as referring to the rules set out by the conventions and customs that define the legality of a state’s right to go to war under international law. However, such a perspective is only a narrow and limited view of what constitutes the *Law of war* and of the relationship between law and war more generally. Here the “Law” of the “Law of war” needs to be understood as involving something more than the limited sense of positive law. The Law of war denotes a broader category that includes differing historical senses of positive law as well as various ethical conceptions of justice, right and rights. This distinction is clearer in German than it is in English whereby the term *Recht* denotes a broader ethical and juristic category than that of *Gesetz* which refers more closely to positive or black letter laws.1 To focus upon the broader category of the Law of war is to put specific (positive law) formulations of the laws of war into a historical, conceptual context. The Law of war contains at its heart arguments about and mechanisms for determining what constitutes *legitimate violence*. The question of what constitutes legitimate violence lies at the centre of the relationship between war and law, and, the specific historical laws of war are merely different juridical ways of setting-out (positing) a particular answer to this question. In this respect the Law of war (and thus its particular laws of war) involves a practice of normative thinking and rule making concerned with determining answers to such questions as: what types of coercion, violence and killing may be included within the definition of “war,” who may legitimately use coercion, violence and killing, and for what reasons, under what circumstances and to what extent may particular actors use coercion, violence and killing understood as war? When we consider the relationship between war and law in this broader sense then it is not unreasonable to entertain the suggestion that at the foundation of the Law of war resides species war. At present, the Law of war is dominated by two cultural-conceptual formulations or discourses. The Westphalian system of interstate relations and the system of international human rights law are held to be modern *foundations* of the Law of war. In the West, most people’s conceptions of what constitutes “war” and of what constitutes a “legitimate” act of war are shaped by these two historical traditions. That is to say, these traditions have ordered how we understand the legitimate use of violence.2 These discourses, however, have been heavily criticized. By building upon a particular line of criticism I develop my argument for the foundational significance of species war. Two critiques of sovereignty and humanitarian law are of particular interest: Michel Foucault’s notion of “race war” and Carl Schmitt’s notion of “friend and enemy.” Foucault in *Society Must Be Defended* set out a particular critique of the Westphalian juridical conception of state sovereignty and state power.3 Within the Westphalian juridical conception, it is commonly argued that sovereign power and legitimacy are grounded upon the ability of an institution to bring an end to internal civil war and create a sphere of domestic peace. Against this Foucault claimed that war is never brought to an end within the domestic sphere, rather, it continues and develops in the form of “race war.” Connected to his account of bio-power, Foucault suggests a historical discourse of constant and perpetual race war that underlies legal and political institutions within modernity.4 In *The Concept of the Political*, Carl Schmitt offered a critique of the liberal conception of the state grounded upon the notion of the “social contract” and criticized legal and political conceptions of the state in which legitimacy (and the legitimacy of war) was seen to be grounded upon the notion of “humanity.”5 For Schmitt the juridical notion of the state (and international human rights law) presupposes and continually re-instates through violence the distinction and relation between “friend and enemy.” Schmitt claimed that the political emerges from the threatening and warlike struggle between friends and enemies and that all political and legal institutions, and the decisions made therein, are built upon and are guided by this distinction.6 In relation to the issue of war/law these two insights can be taken further. I think Foucault’s notion of race war can be developed by putting at its heart the differing historical and genealogical relationships between human and non-human animals. Thus, beyond race war what should be considered as a primary category within legal and political theory is that of *species war*. Further, the fundamental political distinction is not as Schmitt would have it, that of friends and enemies, but rather, the violent conflict between human and non-human animals. Race war is an extension of an earlier form of war, species war. The friend-enemy distinction is an extension of a more primary distinction between human and non-human animals. In this respect, what can be seen to lay at the foundation of the Law of war is not the Westphalian notion of civil peace, or the notion of human rights. Neither race war nor the friend-enemy distinction resides at the bottom of the Law of war. Rather, what sits at the foundation of the Law of war is a discourse of species war that over time has become so naturalised within Western legal and political theory that we have almost forgotten about it. Although species war remains largely hidden because it is not seen as war or even violence at all it continues to affect the ways in which juridical mechanisms order the legitimacy of violence. While species war may not be a Western monopoly, in this account I will only examine a Western variant. This variant, however, is one that may well have been imposed upon the rest of the world through colonization and globalization. In what will follow I offer a sketch of species war and show how the juridical mechanisms for determining what constitutes legitimate violence fall back upon the hidden foundation of species war. I try to do this by showing that the various modern juridical mechanisms for determining what counts as legitimate violence are dependent upon a practice of judging the value of forms of life. I argue that contemporary claims about the legitimacy of war are based upon judgements about differential life-value and that these judgements are an extension of an original practice in which the legitimacy of killing is grounded upon the valuation of the human above the non-human. Further, by giving an overview of the ways in which our understanding of the legitimacy of war has changed, I attempt to show how the notion of species war has been continually excluded from the Law of war and of how contemporary historical movements might open a space for its possible re-inclusion. In this sense, the argument I develop here about species war offers a particular way of reflecting upon the nature of *law* more generally. In a Western juridical tradition, two functions of law are often thought to be: the establishment of order (in the context of the preservation of life, or survival); and, the realization of justice (a thick conception of the “good”). Reflecting upon these in light of the notion of species war helps us to consider that at the heart of both of these functions of law resides a practice of making judgements about the life-value of particular “objects.” These objects are, amongst other things: human individuals, groups of humans, non-human animals, plants, transcendent entities and ideas (the “state,” “community,” etc.). For the law, the practice of making judgements about the relative lifevalue of objects is intimately bound-up with the making of decisions about what objects can be killed. Within our Western conception of the law it is difficult to separate the moment of judgement over life-value from the decision over what constitutes “legitimate violence.” Species war sits within this blurred middle-ground between judgement and decision – it points to a moment at the heart of the law where distinctions of value and acts of violence operate as fundamental to the founding or positing of law. The primary violence of species war then takes place not as something after the establishment of a regime of law (i.e., after the establishment of the city, the state, or international law). Rather, the violence of species war occurs at the beginning of law, at its moment of foundation, as a generator, as a motor.7In J.M. Coetzee’s *The Lives of Animals* 8 the protagonist Elizabeth Costello draws a comparison between the everyday slaughter of non-human animals and the genocide of the Jews of Europe during the twentieth century. “In addressing you on the subject of animals,” she continues, “I will pay you the honour of skipping a recital of the horrors of their lives and deaths. Though I have no reason to believe that you have at the forefront of your minds what is being done to animals at this moment in production facilities (I hesitate to call them farms any longer), in abattoirs, in trawlers, in laboratories, all over the world, I will take it that you concede me the rhetorical power to evoke these horrors and bring them home to you with adequate force, and leave it at that, reminding you only that the horrors I here omit are nevertheless at the center of this lecture.”9 A little while later she states: “Let me say it openly: we are surrounded by an enterprise of degradation, cruelty, and killing which rivals anything that the Third Reich was capable of, indeed dwarfs it, in that ours is an enterprise without end, self-regenerating, bringing rabbits, rats, poultry, livestock ceaselessly into the world for the purpose of killing them.” “And to split hairs, to claim that there is no comparison, that Treblinka was so to speak a metaphysical enterprise dedicated to nothing but death and annihilation while the meat industry is ultimately devoted to life (once its victims are dead, after all, it does not burn them to ash or bury them but on the contrary cuts them up and refrigerates and packs them so that they can be consumed in the comfort of our own homes) is as little consolation to those victims as it would have been – pardon the tastelessness of the following – to ask the dead of Treblinka to excuse their killers because their body fat was needed to make soap and their hair to stuff mattresses with.”10 Similar comparisons have been made before.11 Yet, when most of us think about the term “war” very seldom do we bother to think about non-human animals. The term war commonly evokes images of states, armies, grand weapons, battle lines, tactical stand-offs, and maybe even sometimes guerrilla or partisan violence. Surely the keeping of cattle behind barbed wire fences and butchering them in abattoirs does not count as war? Surely not? Why not? What can be seen to be at stake within Elizabeth Costello’s act of posing the modern project of highly efficient breeding and factory slaughtering of non-human animals beside the Holocaust is a concern with the way in which we order or arrange conceptually and socially the legitimacy of violence and killing. In a “Western” philosophical tradition stretching at least from Augustine and Aquinas, through to Descartes and Kant, the ordering of the relationship between violence and legitimacy is such that, predominantly, non-human animals are considered to be without souls, without reason and without a *value* that is typically ascribed to humans. For example, for Augustine, animals, together with plants, are exempted from the religious injunction “Thou shalt not kill.” When considering the question of what forms of killing and violence are legitimate, Augustine placed the killing of non-human animals well inside the framework of religious and moral legitimacy.12

# 2NC

#### Rejecting humanism is the only way to avoid the replication of violence

Kochi, Queen's University School of Law lecturer, and Ordan, linguist, 08 (Tarik and Noam, Borderlands Volume 7 Number 3, 2008, "An Argument for the Global Suicide of Humanity,")

In another sense the ethical demand to respond to historical and present environmental destruction runs onto and in many ways intensifies the question of radical or revolutionary change which confronted the socialist tradition within the 19th and 20th centuries. As environmental concerns have increasingly since the 1970s come into greater prominence, the pressing issue for many within the 21st century is that of social-environmental revolution. [9] Social- environmental revolution involves the creation of new social, political and economic forms of human and environmental organisation which can overcome the deficiencies and latent oppression of global capitalism and safeguard both human and non-human dignity.¶ Putting aside the old, false assumptions of a teleological account of history, social-environmental revolution is dependent upon widespread political action which short-circuits and tears apart current legal, political and economic regimes. This action is itself dependent upon a widespread change in awareness, a revolutionary change in consciousness, across enough of the populace to spark radical social and political transformation. Thought of in this sense, however, such a response to environmental destruction is caught by many of the old problems which have troubled the tradition of revolutionary socialism. Namely, how might a significant number of human individuals come to obtain such a radically enlightened perspective or awareness of human social reality (i.e. a dialectical, utopian anti-humanist ‘revolutionary consciousnesse’) so that they might bring about with minimal violence the overthrow of the practices and institutions of late capitalism and colonial-speciesism? Further, how might an individual attain such a radical perspective when their life, behaviours and attitudes (or their subjectivity itself) are so moulded and shaped by the individual’s immersion within and active self-realisation through, the networks, systems and habits constitutive of global capitalism? (Hardt & Negri, 2001). While the demand for social-environmental revolution grows stronger, both theoretical and practical answers to these pressing questions remain unanswered.¶ Both liberal and social revolutionary models thus seem to run into the same problems that surround the notion of progress; each play out a modern discourse of sacrifice in which some forms of life and modes of living are set aside in favour of the promise of a future good. Caught between social hopes and political myths, the challenge of responding to environmental destruction confronts, starkly, the core of a discourse of modernity characterised by reflection, responsibility and action. Given the increasing pressures upon the human habitat, this modern discourse will either deliver or it will fail. There is little room for an existence in between: either the Enlightenment fulfils its potentiality or it shows its hand as the bearer of impossibility. If the possibilities of the Enlightenment are to be fulfilled then this can only happen if the old idea of the progress of the human species, exemplified by Hawking’s cosmic colonisation, is fundamentally rethought and replaced by a new form of self-comprehension. This self-comprehension would need to negate and limit the old modern humanism by a radical anti-humanism. The aim, however, would be to not just accept one side or the other, but to re-think the basis of moral action along the lines of a dialectical, utopian anti-humanism. Importantly, though, getting past inadequate conceptions of action, historical time and the futural promise of progress may be dependent upon radically re-comprehending the relationship between humanity and nature in such a way that the human is no longer viewed as the sole core of the subject, or the being of highest value. The human would thus need to no longer be thought of as a master that stands over the non-human. Rather, the human and the non-human need to be grasped together, with the former bearing dignity only so long as it understands itself as a part of the latter.

### Alt Solves

#### Changing the way we conceive our relationship to nature is critical to revealing the social construction of bodies within discourses of oppression

Bell, York University department of education, and Russell, Lakehead University associate professor, 2k (Anne C. and Constance L., department of education, York University, Canada, and Canadian Journal of Environmental Education, “Beyond Human, Beyond Words: Anthropocentrism, Critical Pedagogy, and the Poststructuralist Turn,” CANADIAN JOURNAL OF EDUCATION 25, 3 (2000):188–203, http://www.csse-scee.ca/CJE/Articles/FullText/CJE25-3/CJE25-3-bell.pdf, p. 198-99)

So far, however, such queries in critical pedagogy have been limited by their neglect of the ecological contexts of which students are a part and of relationships extending beyond the human sphere. The gravity of this oversight is brought sharply into focus by writers interested in environ- mental thought, particularly in the cultural and historical dimensions of the environmental crisis. For example, Nelson (1993) contends that our ina- bility to acknowledge our human embeddedness in nature results in our failure to understand what sustains us. We become inattentive to our very real dependence on others and to the ways our actions affect them. Educators, therefore, would do well to draw on the literature of environ- mental thought in order to come to grips with the misguided sense of independence, premised on freedom from nature, that informs such no- tions as “empowerment.”¶ Further, calls for educational practices situated in the life-worlds of students go hand in hand with critiques of disembodied approaches to education. In both cases, critical pedagogy challenges the liberal notion of education whose sole aim is the development of the individual, rational mind (Giroux, 1991, p. 24; McKenna, 1991, p. 121; Shapiro, 1994). Theorists draw attention to the importance of nonverbal discourse (e.g., Lewis & Simon, 1986, p. 465) and to the somatic character of learning (e.g., Shapiro, 1994, p. 67), both overshadowed by the intellectual authority long granted to rationality and science (Giroux, 1995; Peters, 1995; S. Taylor, 1991). Describing an “emerging discourse of the body” that looks at how bodies are represented and inserted into the social order, S. Taylor (1991) cites as examples the work of Peter McLaren, Michelle Fine, and Philip Corrigan.¶ A complementary vein of enquiry is being pursued by environmental researchers and educators critical of the privileging of science and abstract thinking in education. They understand learning to be mediated not only through our minds but also through our bodies. Seeking to acknowledge and create space for sensual, emotional, tacit, and communal knowledge, they advocate approaches to education grounded in, for example, nature experience and environmental practice (Bell, 1997; Brody, 1997; Weston, 1996). Thus, whereas both critical pedagogy and environmental education offer a critique of disembodied thought, one draws attention to the ways in which the body is situated in culture (Shapiro, 1994) and to “the social construction of bodies as they are constituted within discourses of race, class, gender, age and other forms of oppression” (S. Taylor, 1991, p. 61). The other emphasizes and celebrates our embodied relatedness to the more-than-human world and to the myriad life forms of which it is comprised (Payne, 1997; Russell & Bell, 1996). Given their different foci, each stream of enquiry stands to be enriched by a sharing of insights.¶ Finally, with regard to the poststructuralist turn in educational theory, ongoing investigations stand to greatly enhance a revisioning of environ- mental education. A growing number of environmental educators question the empirical-analytical tradition and its focus on technical and behavioural aspects of curriculum (A. Gough, 1997; Robottom, 1991). Advocating more interpretive, critical approaches, these educators contest the discursive frameworks (e.g., positivism, empiricism, rationalism) that mask the values, beliefs, and assumptions underlying information, and thus the cultural and political dimensions of the problems being considered (A. Gough, 1997; Huckle, 1999; Lousley, 1999). Teaching about ecological processes and environmental hazards in a supposedly objective and rational manner is understood to belie the fact that knowledge is socially constructed and therefore partial (A. Gough, 1997; Robertson, 1994; Robottom, 1991; Stevenson, 1993).

#### Basing rights on sentience applies rights towards nonhumans

**Best 5** “The New Abolitionism: Capitalism, Slavery and Animal Liberation

Just as nineteenth century abolitionists sought to awaken people to the greatest moral issue of the day, so the new abolitionists of the 21st century endeavor to enlighten people about the enormity and importance of animal suffering and oppression. As black slavery earlier raised fundamental questions about the meaning of American “democracy” and modern values, so current discussion regarding animal slavery provokes critical examination into a human psyche damaged by violence, arrogance, and alienation, and the urgent need for a new ethics and sensibility rooted in respect for all life.¶ Animal liberation is not an alien concept to modern culture; rather it builds on the most progressive ethical and political values Westerners have devised in the last two hundred years –those of equality, democracy, and rights – as it carries them to their logical conclusion. Whereas ethicists such as Arthur Kaplan argue that rights are cheapened when extended to animals, it is far more accurate to see this move as the redemption of rights from an arbitrary and prejudicial limitation of their true meaning.¶ The next great step in moral evolution is to abolish the last acceptable form of slavery that subjugates the vast majority of species on this planet to the violent whim of one. Moral advance today involves sending human supremacy to the same refuse bin that society earlier discarded much male supremacy and white supremacy. Animal liberation requires that people transcend the complacent boundaries of humanism in order to make a qualitative leap in ethical consideration, thereby moving the moral bar from reason and language to sentience and subjectivity.¶ Animal liberation is the culmination of a vast historical learning process whereby human beings gradually realize that arguments justifying hierarchy, inequality, and discrimination of any kind are arbitrary, baseless, and fallacious. Moral progress occurs in the process of demystifying and deconstructing all myths — from ancient patriarchy and the divine right of kings to Social Darwinism and speciesism — that attempt to legitimate the domination of one group over another. Moral progress advances through the dynamic of replacing hierarchical visions with egalitarian visions and developing a broader and more inclusive ethical community. Having recognized the illogical and unjustifiable rationales used to oppress blacks, women, and other disadvantaged groups, society is beginning to grasp that speciesism is another unsubstantiated form of oppression and discrimination.

### Perm

The permutation devolves into self-serving rationalizations—ethical compromises are unacceptable.

Lupisella & Logsdon 97

(Mark, masters degree in philosophy of science at university of Maryland and researcher working at the Goddard Space Flight Center, and John, Director, Space Policy Institute The George Washington University, Washington, “DO WE NEED A COSMOCENTRIC ETHIC?” <http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.25.7502>)

Steve Gillett has suggested a hybrid view combining homocentrism as applied to terrestrial activity combined with biocentrism towards worlds with indigenous life.32 Invoking such a patchwork of theories to help deal with different domains and circumstances could be considered acceptable and perhaps even desirable especially when dealing with something as varied and complex as ethics. Indeed, it has a certain common sense appeal. However, instead of digging deeply into what is certainly a legitimate epistemological issue, let us consider the words of J. Baird Callicott: “But there is both a rational philosophical demand and a human psychological need for a self-consistent and all-embracing moral theory. We are neither good philosophers nor whole persons if for one purpose we adopt utilitarianism, another deontology, a third animal liberation, a fourth the land ethic, and so on. Such ethical eclecticism is not only rationally intolerable, it is morally suspect as it invites the suspicion of ad hoc rationalizations for merely expedient or self-serving actions.”33

The permutation is worse—The combination of aesthetics and ethics still reifies the ethical differential—ethical concerns always take a back seat to material concerns in the policy resolution.

**Doremus**, Winter **2k**. [Holly, Professor of Law, University of California at Davis, J.D., University of California at Berkeley, Ph.D., Cornell University, “The Rhetoric and Reality of Nature Protection: Toward a New Discourse,” 57 Wash & Lee L. Rev. 11, lexis]. JLH

Combining aesthetic and ethical arguments with the material discourse does not automatically solve this problem. Because material benefits are more readily quantified, they are likely to outweigh nonmaterial benefits in the cost-benefit comparisons encouraged by the material focus. The predictable result is that material benefits will be maximized at the cost of nonmaterial ones. The national parks provide a concrete example. Park proponents first argued that national parks were important for their esthetic qualities, which could express and strengthen the national character. But in order to build political support they added that parks would benefit local and national economies. As a result, park managers felt compelled to promote heavy visitation in order to realize the economic benefits they had promised, at the expense of maintaining the parks' distinctive esthetic and character-building values. n228 With this history as background, environmentalists should be wary of emphasizing the material discourse in politi-cal debates. They are likely to find that the political benefits of that strategy, although real, are outweighed by its ten-dency to skew policies in ways that systematically underestimate, or even deny, the nonmaterial values of nature.

### 2NC – Ethics Impact

#### All species have intrinsic value

**Shepard 3**

Florence Shepard. DEEP ECOLOGY FOR TIlE 21 ST CENTURY, 2003 [h ttp :/lwww . newd imensions .org/on 1 ine-j ournal/artic les/deep-eco logyhtm 1]

**The diverse voices of leading ecologists and activists inspire us to renew our efforts to bring ecological harmony to Planet Earth.** They bring us hope that though direct involvement in our own bioregions, at the same time staying abreast of world-wide problems, we can help turn around the global ecological disasters that seem imminent. Although unique, each viewpoint shares the common, ethical tenets of deep ecology: **The community of companions on Planet Earth is egalitarian, they tell us. The lives of all creatures are of intrinsic value. The quality of life on earth for all species depends on mindful, tempered actions by humans, the dominant organism interdependently joined to all others and to the air, water, and terrain**. Deep Ecology is not a political or economic ideology yet it affects all of our actions and decisions, it is a spiritual**, egalitarian orientation to life on Earth that can and must be embraced by all peoples of all beliefs, if we are to turn the tide of human population growth and massive habitat and species destruction on Planet Earth. There is really no other way out of the crisis we face. It is a matter of conscience, ethics, and action. Although we must act locally, we must look beyond our own gardens and recycling bins.** For Kirkpatrick Sale this means moving from an individualistic to a community orientation. With their deconstruction of so-called “free-trade,” Jerry Mander and Helena Norberg-1-lodge explain how global commerce is destroying local economies and cultures. Sessions suggests that changes will require radical alterations in our life iyies and must include action at the personal and local level as well as thoughtful involvement in global issues.

#### This means if we win a link, they lose - The debate is not a question of whether or not they benefit people – it’s about whether or not the 1AC violates the intrinsic value of human and non-human animals

Eric **Katz**, Director of Science, Technology, and Society Program at the New Jersey Institute of Technology, **1997**

[*Nature as Subject* p. 9-10]

**Utilitarianism** might be salvaged for use in the environmental debate if it is stripped of its bias towards the satisfaction of human needs and preferences. Bentham, it should be remembered, considered the pains and pleasures of the animal kingdom to be of important, a utilitarian calculation. According to this kind of position, the needs and desires of the wildlife in a given area would have to be considered prior to any development or destruction for the purpose of human betterment **Unfortunately**, the problems with this kind of broad utilitarianism appear **insurmountable**. How does the satisfaction of **animal** needs compare in utility with the satisfaction of **human** needs? Can we bring plant life into the calculation? What about nonliving entities, such as rock formations (e.g., the Grand Canyon) or entire ecological areas? Does a marsh have an interest in not being drained and turned into a golf course, a need or desire to continue a natural existence? It is clear that difficult--if not impossible--problems arise when we begin to consider utility for nonhuman and nonsentient entities. A second alternative, highly tentative, is a movement away from a "want-oriented perspective" in ethical theory. Rather than evaluat­ing the moral worth of an action by the **consequences** which satisfy needs and desires in the humyn (or even nonhumyn) world, we can look at the **intrinsic** qualities of the action, and determine what kind of **values** this action manifests. The question which the debate over environmental preservation raises is *not* "Does preservation of this par­ticular natural object lead to a better world?" but rather "'Do we **want a world** in which the preservation of natural objects is considered an important **value**?" The question is **not** whether the preservation of a certain entity increases the amount of satisfaction and **pleasure** in the world, but rather, whether these pleasures, satisfactions, and needs ought to be pursued. The question, in short, is about what kind of **moral universe** **ought to be created**. Only when the preservation of natural objects is seen to be an **intrinsically** good policy of action, rather than a means to some kind of **satisfaction**, will a policy of environmental protection be explained and justified. The development of an ethical theory which can accomplish this task will be a difficult undertaking, but it is the only choice open to preservationists.

### 2NC – Root Cause

#### We control root cause – their impacts are just the extension of anthropocentric logic

Kochi, Queen's University School of Law lecturer, and Ordan, linguist, 08 (Tarik and Noam, Borderlands Volume 7 Number 3, 2008, "An Argument for the Global Suicide of Humanity,")

When taking a wider view of history, one which focuses on the relationship of humans towards other species, it becomes clear that the human heritage – and the propagation of itself as a thing of value – has occurred on the back of seemingly endless acts of violence, destruction, killing and genocide. While this cannot be verified, perhaps ‘human’ history and progress begins with the genocide of the Neanderthals and never loses a step thereafter. It only takes a short glimpse at the list of all the sufferings caused by humanity for one to begin to question whether this species deserves to continue into the future. The list of human-made disasters is ever-growing after all: suffering caused to animals in the name of science or human health, not to mention the cosmetic, food and textile industries; damage to the environment by polluting the earth and its stratosphere; deforesting and overuse of natural resources; and of course, inflicting suffering on fellow human beings all over the globe, from killing to economic exploitation to abusing minorities, individually and collectively.

# 1NR

#### ---The claim that everyone is always already a cyborg is a dangerous form of cultural essentialism that universalizes the western subject and internal link turns all their ethics offense.

Ben-Tov 1995

Sharona, Assistant Professor of Creative Writing and English, Bowling Green State University, The Artificial Paradise: Science Fiction and American Reality, pg. 144-145

Moreover, we have to be careful about using the cyborg myth appropriately across cultures. “Perhaps,” Haraway suggests “we can learn from our fusions with animals and machines how not to be Man, the embodiment of Western logocs” (*MC* 92). Do the women of Japan, Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore, and other Asian states with high-tech industries, need to learn how not to be the embodiment of the Western logos? The cyborg is “a myth about identities and boundaries which might inform late-twentieth century political imaginations…[Science fiction writers] are our storytellers exploring what it means to be embodied in high-tech worlds” (92). Whose late twentieth century are we talking about? Is “embodiment in high-tech worlds” a universal experience? Science fiction’s tales of embodiment come from Western myths, express Western experience, and paint Western fantasies. Other cultures’ interactions with high-tech machinery do not necessarily guarantee their conversion to Western outlooks. Discussing a feminist approach to miniaturization technology, Haraway remarks that “the nimble little fingers of ‘Oriental’ women, the old fascination of little Anglo-Saxon Victorian girls with doll houses, women’s enforced attention to the small take on quite new dimensions in this world…it might be the unnatural cyborg women making chips in Asia and spiral dancing in Santa Rita whose constructed unities will guide effective oppositional strategies” (71). I am concerned that the “constructed unities” here amount to imposing the cyborg myth on people who might have oppositional strategies of their own, drawn from their own cultural resources. The dolls’ house and the cult of domesticity remind us of a known Western cultural tradition, but “nimble little fingers” is mere rhetoric—Haraway puts the orientalist cliché in ironical quotes, yet what, after her irony, is left of the Asian women and their cultural traditions? Nothing but Western words. Is it really fair to subsume under the label of “cyborg” two different groups: women whose spiral dancing, although political, is also playful mythmaking and women working in harsh conditions, whose myths we are not discussing here? Perhaps it’s worth recalling, with critical theorist Gayatri Spivak, that the tendency to erase the cultural Other is “*not* a general problem, but a *European* problem.” The cyborg and other science fiction mythologies may indeed be useful to cultural Others in the technological system, but—speaking to Westerners—knowing ourselves, caution is indicated.